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reversed.
Keywords: Fiscal Policy, New Open Economy Macroeconomics, Money Demand Specification,
Flexible Exchange Rates, Monetary Union, Pricing-to-Market
JEL Classification: F31, F32, F41 and F42
∗University of Frankfurt, pitterle@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de.
†University of Frankfurt, steffen@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de.
‡The authors wish to express their appreciation to Uwe Walz and to participants of the EEFS 2004 con-
ference in Gdansk for helpful comments. Financial support of the German Science Foundation is gratefully
acknowledged.
1 Introduction
One of the most prominent topics in international finance is the transmission of monetary and
fiscal policies in an international context. In particular, researchers are interested in the effects
of the respective policy on exchange rate movements, international price differentials, output
stimulation, and welfare. Since Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962) economists have tried to
address these issues by formal models. While well established not only in the scientific arena
but also in practice, international macro-models of the Mundell-Fleming (MF) type have a
severe drawback: The entire absence of microfoundations results in the use of ad-hoc welfare
criteria for the evaluation of alternative policy regimes. Starting with Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1995), a new promising strand in international macroeconomics has emerged, that combines
rigorous microfoundations with the MF assumption of nominal rigidities. This approach allows
for an explicit welfare analysis on the basis of the households’ preference structure. Today,
the so-called New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) framework provides the standard
workhorse for analyzing the international transmission of monetary and fiscal policy in the
theoretical literature.
While most of the early NOEM literature has focused on the effects of monetary policy,
the formation of the European Monetary Union has stirred increased interest in the analysis
of fiscal policy issues. The cost of losing monetary policy as a potential stabilization tool is
of great concern particularly among the acceding countries of the European Union. Policy
makers have to decide whether to join the European Monetary Union or to only participate in
the European Single Market. In that context, renewed attention is directed to fiscal policy as
a stabilization instrument. Recent developments in NOEM research may serve to reassess the
effectiveness of fiscal policy under alternative exchange rate regimes in terms of welfare.
In this paper, we contribute to the discussion of fiscal policy in the field of New Open
Economy Macroeconomics by exploring international fiscal transmission mechanisms and the
associated welfare effects under alternative exchange rate regimes. We propose a general anal-
ysis framework that enables us to boil down the model to very tractable semi-reduced welfare
equations. Specifically, we show that the exchange rate policy implications of NOEM type
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models are highly sensitive to the theoretical choice of the scale variable of money demand.
Against the backdrop of asymmetric fiscal expansions, households in the country where the
expansion takes place prefer flexible exchange rates to a monetary union when money demand
is based on private consumption as it is standard in NOEM models with money-in-the-utility
(MIU). Once the scale variable of money demand amounts to total absorption, the opposite
exchange rate policy implication applies.
So far, the issue of the scale variable of money demand against the background of fiscal
policy has not been addressed in the NOEM literature.1 Most of the models rely on money-
in-the-utility specifications, where the scale variable of money demand is private consumption,
even though the neglect of the public component of money demand leads to very different
implications for the exchange rate response and the resulting welfare effects of fiscal policy.
In a Mundell-Fleming framework, Chang and Lai (1997) explore alternative specifications of
money demand and its implications for the analysis of fiscal policy. Especially the dynamics
of the exchange rate hinge crucially on the respective scale variable of money demand. In
the case of monetary disturbances, the analysis of competing scale variables is of less impor-
tance because private consumption is then the only component of overall expenditure. In a
comprehensive theoretical and empirical analysis of alternative money demand specifications
Mankiw and Summers (1986) demonstrate that in Keynesian-type models the effects of fiscal
policy are quite sensitive to the choice of the scale variable.2 The authors point out that in
principal all components of GNP - including consumer expenditure, investment spending and
government expenditure - may generate money demand. However, the relative significance of
these components varies substantially. Mankiw and Summers’ empirical study on the allo-
cation of money to GNP components, which is based on US data of the year 1980, suggests
that private consumption expenditure is by far the most important source of overall money
demand. At the same time, however, the observed 20 percent share of government expenditure
in GNP translates into 9 percent of M1 holdings allocated to this component. In light of the
much greater importance of the public sector in European countries this finding suggests that
1For extensive surveys on fiscal policy in NOEM models, see Ganelli and Lane (2002) and Coutinho (2003).
2Further empirical studies addressing the question of the appropriate scale variable of money demand are
provided by Elyasiani and Nasseh (1994) and Thornton (1988). A survey of recent empirical money demand
studies is provided by Sriram (2001a).
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a substantial part of money demand in Europe stems from public sources.
There are several ways to overcome problems that are associated with the missing public
component in the scale variable of money demand. The most direct approach is to impose cash-
in-advance constraints not only on private households but also on governments. By employing
this modelling strategy we follow Sargent (1987), chapter V, and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2000).3 For tractability, we opt for a rigid cash-in-advance constraint in the spirit of Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2001), where the interest elasticity of money demand is zero. In a two-country
NOEM model with cash-in-advance constraints on households and governments, we investigate
the implications of alternative money demand specifications for the comparison of a flexible
exchange rate regime with a monetary union allowing for pricing-to-market (PTM) behavior of
firms. Following Betts and Devereux (2000), we generate pricing-to-market by assuming that
goods prices are temporarily sticky in the currency of the importer.4 Via variations in public
cash requirements we explore the role of alternative scale variables of money demand for the
welfare evaluation of asymmetric fiscal expansions. The general analysis framework allows us
to derive results that are independent of the persistence of the fiscal expansions.
We show that a welfare comparison of exchange rate regimes depends essentially on the
direction of the exchange rate response under the flexible regime and on the degree of PTM
behavior. When the scale variable is private consumption as in standard money-in-the-utility
models, a domestic fiscal expansion yields a depreciation of the exchange rate under a flexi-
ble regime. As the associated expenditure switching and terms-of-trade effects are generally
beneficial to the domestic country, domestic households prefer a flexible exchange rate regime
to a monetary union. However, when the scale variable of money demand is total absorption,
we obtain an appreciation of the exchange rate and the results of the welfare comparison are
reversed. A higher degree of pricing-to-market reinforces the respective welfare differentials
between the two exchange rate regimes. In the polar case of no pricing-to-market, the ex-
penditure switching and terms-of-trade effects prevailing under a flexible exchange rate regime
3Alternatively, a cash-in-advance approach, where households need cash to purchase consumption goods and
to pay taxes, also takes account of the public component of money demand. Pitterle and Steffen (2004a) and
Pitterle and Steffen (2004b) pursue this modelling strategy.
4An alternative way of modelling PTM can be found in Bergin (2004). In his analysis of PTM in a monetary
union, the author opts for translog preferences. Thereby, he relies neither on price rigidities nor does PTM
disappear in a monetary union.
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are exactly offsetting. Both exchange rate regimes are then equivalent in terms of the welfare
implications of asymmetric fiscal policies. In the end, more empirical research is necessary
to decide upon the most appropriate way to model money demand and to determine which
exchange rate regime is preferable with fiscal policy being the major source of macroeconomic
disturbances.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief description of the model economies
at issue. Section 3 provides the positive analysis, while section 4 explores the welfare implica-
tions of asymmetric fiscal policies. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a world that consists of two open economies we refer to as home (h) and foreign
(f). All foreign variables will be denoted with an asterisk. The countries are populated by n
and (1−n) households, respectively. On the production side, there are n and (1−n) firms that
all produce a single differentiated good. Domestic and foreign households interact on the bond
market whereas firms trade goods on common goods markets. The production factor labor
is assumed to be immobile between countries. As for the exchange rate regime, we consider
flexible exchange rates (regime I) and a monetary union (regime II). In the analysis of regime I,
we follow Betts and Devereux (2000) in that we allow for different pricing behaviors. A fraction
s of firms is able to segment the markets in the two countries, as consumers cannot trade these
goods and arbitrage away possible price differences. Thus, the law of one price need not hold
for this kind of goods. We assume that these “pricing-to-market” (PTM) firms set prices in the
currency of the consumer.5 The remaining (1− s) goods can be traded by consumers so that
prices cannot differ in the two countries when expressed in the same currency, i.e. the law of
one price will always hold. As the prices of these goods are set in the currency of the producer,
we refer to them as PCP (Producer Currency Pricing) goods. In regime II, the distinction
between PTM and PCP firms is irrelevant.
5In fact, our concept of pricing-to-market is based on local currency pricing. For brevity, we use the expression
“pricing-to-market” throughout the analysis.
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2.1 Households
We describe the details of the model for the home country only since most of the equations for
the foreign country are completely analogous. We assume that households in both countries
are infinitely long living and that they have identical preferences, such that the concept of
a representative agent can be applied. The representative domestic household maximizes his
discounted life-time utility given by
U =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
log ct − κ2 h
2
t + V (gt)
]
(1)
where β ∈ [0, 1] denotes the discount factor. Thus, households derive utility from three different
sources. In contrast to most of the NOEM literature we do not assume that government
expenditures gt are purely dissipative. Instead, they affect private utility in an additively
separable way via the function V (gt), which is assumed to be a twice differentiable convex
function, that increases monotonously in its argument gt.6 Households also gain utility from
leisure (1 − ht). Assuming a quadratic cost of effort, i.e. −κ2 h2t , we capture the implied
disutility of labor.7 Finally, ct represents a CES real consumption index, which integrates over
a basket of goods produced in the domestic economy - denoted with h - and a basket of goods
produced in the foreign economy that are denoted with f . Both consumption baskets consist
of a fraction s of goods, which are priced to market - denoted with m - and a fraction (1− s)
of goods - denoted with a - for which the law of one price always holds. For instance, cmt (h)
denotes the representative domestic household’s consumption of a domestically produced good
that is priced to market. The domestic real consumption index thus reads:
6For an analysis of fiscal policy when private and public consumption are not additively separable, see
Ganelli (2003). Obviously, the crowding out of private consumption will then be more pronounced, and the
output stimulating effects of fiscal policy are limited.
7For the sake of a better empirical fit of the model, it is straightforward to extend the model for a general
convex cost of effort as in Tille (2001). However, the qualitative implications of the model would not change.
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ct =
[ ∫ sn
0
cmt (h)
θ−1
θ dh+
∫ n
sn
cat (h)
θ−1
θ dh
+
∫ (1−n)s+n
n
cmt (f)
θ−1
θ df +
∫ 1
(1−n)s+n
cat (f)
θ−1
θ df
] θ
θ−1 (2)
The parameter θ > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution between the differentiated goods,
with higher values of θ implying a better substitutability of goods. We assume that cross-
country and within-country substitutabilities of goods are identical.8 The price index pt, which
corresponds to equation (2), is obtained by minimizing the household’s nominal expenditure
that buys exactly one unit of the consumption index. Let pmt (.) be the price of an individual
PTM good and pat (.) the price of a PCP good. Then, the home country price index is given by
pt =
(∫ sn
0
pmt (h)
1−θ dh+
∫ n
sn
pat (h)
1−θ dh
+
∫ (1−n)s+n
n
pmt (f)
1−θ df +
∫ 1
(1−n)s+n
(pa∗t (f) et)
1−θ df
) 1
1−θ (3)
where prices without (with) an asterisk are denoted in home (foreign) currency and et represents
the nominal exchange rate.9 Of course, under regime II the respective price aggregators and
individual prices are given in the common currency adopted by the two countries. Note from
equation (3), that a pure exchange rate variation will affect the home country price index only
through a change of the domestic price of PCP goods produced in the foreign country. The
prices of imported PTM goods are directly set in the domestic currency and are therefore not
subject to exchange rate fluctuations.
It will turn out in the subsequent analysis, that the terms-of-trade are crucial for the
evaluation of welfare against the backdrop of a fiscal expansion. We define the domestic terms
8Tille (1999, 2001) examines the consequences of different elasticities of substitution within countries and
between them.
9We define the exchange rate in price notation from the perspective of the domestic country.
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of trade as follows
Tt = ΓtΓ∗t et
(4)
where Γt denotes the domestic export price index in foreign currency, and Γ∗t the foreign export
price index in domestic currency.
Households allocate consumption expenditures optimally among the differentiated goods.
This yields the following domestic per capita demand functions for PTM and PCP goods:
cat (h) =
(pat (h)
pt
)−θ
ct c
a
t (f) =
(et pa∗t (f)
pt
)−θ
ct
cmt (h) =
(pmt (h)
pt
)−θ
ct c
m
t (f) =
(pmt (f)
pt
)−θ
ct
As opposed to the majority of NOEMmodels, we introduce money into the model economies
via a cash-in-advance constraint that captures the role of money as a transaction medium.
Hence, the representative household’s optimization problem is restricted by the budget con-
straint
mprivt +Rtft+1 ≤ ft + wtht +Πt − pt Tt (5)
and the cash-in-advance constraint
mprivt ≥ pt ct (6)
The budget constraint (5) says that nominal expenditure on cash holdings and on bond pur-
chases cannot exceed income after taxes which is derived from maturing bonds, from the remu-
neration of labor effort and from profits of domestic firms.10 In order to smooth consumption,
households internationally trade nominal one-period bonds ft+1, that are either denominated
in domestic currency units (regime I) or in the common currency (regime II). The bond price
10We rule out cross-country ownership of firms.
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Rt is inversely related to the nominal interest rate. Our timing convention is the following:
Bonds denoted with t+1 are acquired at the beginning of period t and mature at the beginning
of period t+ 1.
The specification of the budget constraint is a short cut to Helpman (1981) as money
holdings are not carried over from the previous period, though it is theoretically possible to do
so. As Helpman points out, households will not find it reasonable to hold money over periods in
the presence of interest yielding bonds. Money thereby reduces “to money to spend”. Another
important aspect of the budget constraint is the timing of payments. Households receive
nominal labor income wtht and profits Πt instantaneously. In that respect we follow Carre´
and Collard (2003). We thereby avoid an additional source of distortions that would blur
our analysis of fiscal policy with nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition being the
distortion of our interest.
Additionally, households face a cash-in-advance constraint (6) a` la Helpman (1981) and
Lucas (1980, 1982) which is binding in the light of positive nominal interest rates. Households
need money in order to carry out consumption goods purchases. Our specification rules out
possible distortions of the consumption decision by unexpected inflation as households decide
on money demand after the occurrence of shocks. The special form of the cash-in-advance
constraint can also be found in the literature on real indeterminacy, see for example Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2001). As the cash-in-advance constraint determines the household’s demand for
money, this specification leads to a zero interest elasticity of money demand. 11
Households maximize intertemporal utility (1) subject to the constraints (5) and (6). The
implied domestic Euler equations and optimal labor-leisure trade-offs and its foreign counter-
parts are stated in table 1.
Private money demand in both countries is simply given by the respective cash-in-advance
constraints. In order to fully characterize the equilibrium on part of the households, a standard
transversality condition has to be imposed.
11Carlstrom and Fuerst refer to this approach as a rigid cash-in-advance constraint.
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Table 1: Domestic and foreign optimality conditions
β pt ct = Rt pt+1 ct+1 β p∗t c∗t = Rt
et+1
et
p∗t+1 c
∗
t+1
κht =
wt
ct pt
κh∗t =
w∗t
c∗t p∗t
2.2 Central Banks and Governments
Our analysis concentrates on fiscal policy that is not accommodated by the monetary authori-
ties. This assumption does not alter the implications of fiscal policy because shocks to real
government expenditures and money supply shocks are additive in our model.
Under regime I (flexible exchange rate), the two independent central banks leave money
supply unchanged:
mst = m
s
t−1 = m¯
s = ms∗t = m
s∗
t−1 = m¯
s∗
This monetary stance can be motivated by a monetary entity that focuses exclusively on price
stability. Specifically, price developments that result from optimal adjustments to fundamental
disturbances are not accommodated by expansive or restrictive monetary policies.
Under regime II (monetary union), the common central bank leaves world money supply
unchanged. This implies that money supply cannot be controlled separately for the individual
countries. Hence, the international money demand pattern determines the amount of currency
in circulation in the respective countries.
The government decides in every period on purchases of public goods gt. Let the public
consumption index be defined analogously to the real consumption index (2) of the represen-
tative household. Following our discussion of the representative household’s utility function,
government spending is assumed to enhance private utility in an additive way. Due to the
specification of the central bank’s policy, the government cannot rely on seignorage as a fi-
nancing source for public expenditures. Therefore, the government finances its expenditures
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solely via lump sum taxes Tt.12 The per capita government budget constraint then reduces to
gt = Tt (7)
We follow Sargent (1987) and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2000) in that the government also
faces a cash-in-advance constraint for its purchases. This assumption can be motivated by
empirical findings that suggest a substantial role of government expenditures for overall money
demand, see Mankiw and Summers (1986). We modify the standard specification in that we
introduce a parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] that governs the extent of public cash requirements. The
public CIA constraint then reads:
mgovt ≥ λpt gt (8)
The general formulation provides a high degree of flexibility that allows to capture the whole
range of possible public cash requirements. Our main focus, however, lies on the two polar
cases λ = 0 and λ = 1. In the former case, public expenditures are not exposed to cash
constraints. In the latter, all government purchases are subject to cash requirements such that
the government faces the same constraint as private households.
2.3 Firms
The general setup of firms holds under both exchange rate regimes, even though the explicit
distinction between pricing-to-market and producer currency pricing is irrelevant under regime
II, where all producers behave like PCP producers. We assume that output of PTM and PCP
firms is linear in its only production factor labor, which is immobile between countries.13 Recall
that both types of firms sell goods on the domestic and on the foreign market. In the case
of PCP firms, consumers can arbitrage away price differences, such that the law of one price
always holds for this type of goods. Total production of each domestic PCP firm h ∈ [s · n, n]
12Introducing distortionary taxes such as income or consumption taxes may be a fruitful extension of the
model.
13As it is standard in the NOEM literature, we do not consider capital as an input factor. The inherent
problem of including capital accumulation in this model context consists in the fact that analytical solutions
cannot be derived.
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is given by yat (h) = h
a
t (h). Hence, each PCP firm solves the following optimization problem:
max
pat (h)
Πat (h) = p
a
t (h)y
a
t (h)− wthat (h)
s.t. yat (h) =
(
pat (h)
pt
)−θ
n(ct + gt) +
(
pat (h)
et p∗t
)−θ
(1− n)(c∗t + g∗t )
In contrast to PCP firms, PTM firms h ∈ [0, s · n] can in principle discriminate between
domestic and foreign markets such that prices for their goods - when expressed in the same
currency - may differ in the two countries. Dividing total output of each domestic PTM firm
into output sold at home, ymt (h), and abroad, y
m∗
t (h), gives y
m
t (h) + y
m∗
t (h) = h
m
t (h). PTM
firms therefore maximize profits by distinguishing explicitly between demand addressed to
them by domestic households and demand by foreign households. For each of the locations of
demand they set the profit maximizing price. The optimization problem therefore reads
max
pmt (h), p
m∗
t (h)
Πmt (h) = p
m
t (h)y
m
t (h) + etp
m∗
t (h)y
m∗
t (h)− wthmt (h)
s.t. ymt (h) =
(
pmt (h)
pt
)−θ
n(ct + gt) and ym∗t (h) =
(
pm∗t (h)
p∗t
)−θ
(1− n)(c∗t + g∗t )
Deriving the optimal price setting rules for both types of firms shows that the optimal price
is always given as a markup on nominal production costs:
pat (h) = p
m
t (h) = etp
m∗
t (h) =
θ
θ − 1wt (9)
Producers dispose of monopoly power because they all produce a single differentiated good.
From equation (9) we see that all domestically produced goods have the same domestic currency
price, as long as producers are free to set prices. Since the elasticities of demand are the same
in both markets, PTM firms will not charge different prices across countries and the law of
one price also holds for their goods. Furthermore, all domestic firms face the same marginal
production costs, resulting in an equalization of prices for PCP and PTM goods. Thus, when
prices are flexible, purchasing power parity always holds and the distinction between PCP and
PTM firms becomes irrelevant even under regime I. In the light of rigid prices, however, a
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variation of the nominal exchange rate results in different domestic currency prices of PTM
goods sold at home and abroad. Profits in domestic currency from sales of PTM goods in
the foreign country fluctuate endogenously in this case: A nominal exchange rate appreciation
of the domestic currency lowers nominal revenues in the domestic currency, while a nominal
depreciation raises nominal revenues.
Note that a better substitutability between the goods, i.e. a higher level of θ, reduces the
market power of producers and implies a smaller markup on nominal production costs, which
leads to a higher equilibrium output level. Hence, the degree of monopolistic distortion in the
economy, which translates into a welfare loss for households, is a decreasing function of θ.
3 Positive Analysis of Asymmetric Fiscal Expansions
With the setup of the model at hand, we now turn to the policy experiment of an unantic-
ipated asymmetric fiscal shock. We propose a general analysis framework that is valid for
both temporary and permanent fiscal expansions. Thereby, it is possible to derive policy rec-
ommendations that are independent of assumptions about the persistence of macroeconomic
disturbances. This section gives a brief description of the solution process and sketches the
positive results of the analysis in a semi-reduced form. In section 4, the positive results are
evaluated in terms of private utility to the end of a welfare-based evaluation of a transition
from flexible exchange rates to a monetary union.
We assume that prices are temporarily sticky and cannot be adjusted in the period when
the fiscal shock occurs.14 In the long run, prices are fully flexible and producers set the optimal
price according to equation (9). Therefore, the economy reaches its new steady state right after
the shock period.15 Given this special structure of price rigidities, we may split the algebraic
problem into long and short run subsets of equations that can be treated almost independently.
The combination of the short run (period t) and long run (period t + 1) solution yields the
solution for exchange rates (under regime I), consumption levels, hours worked and price levels.
14Price stickiness can be motivated by a menu cost argument, see Mankiw (1985).
15Models that endogenize price rigidities via explicit price adjustment costs like Hairault and Portier (1993)
or use Calvo (1983) style price determination as in Kollmann (2001a, 2001b) yield more dynamic optimization
problems of the firms. Though these approaches are richer in structure as the economies gradually approach
the new steady state they hamper the finding of analytical solutions.
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The essential link between the short and long run system will be bond holdings that have been
acquired in the shock period.
3.1 Equilibria
This section presents the equilibrium conditions, which comprise money markets, current ac-
counts, goods markets, and Euler equations in the short and long run. As usual in this type of
model, the labor market clearing condition is only binding in the long run, because production
is entirely demand determined in the short run.
To start with, consider the money market clearing conditions under the two exchange
rate regimes. In the short and long run, the domestic money market under regime I (flexible
exchange rates) reads
msτ
pτ
=
mprivτ
pτ
+
mgovτ
pτ
= cτ + λgτ (10)
where τ takes the values t and t + 1. An analogous expression holds for the foreign country.
Note that the parameter λ governs the scale variable of overall money demand. For λ = 0,
the scale variable amounts to private consumption as in standard money-in-the-utility NOEM
models. For λ = 1, the scale variable is total absorption, i.e. the sum of private consumption
and public spending.
The money market under regime II (monetary union) reads
mswτ
pτ
= n
(
mprivτ
pτ
+
mgovτ
pτ
)
+ (1− n)
(
mpriv ∗τ
p∗τ
+
mgov ∗τ
p∗τ
)
= cwτ + λg
w
τ (11)
wheremswt denotes the central bank’s world money supply that equals the population weighted
sum of domestic and foreign money demand. Union-wide real balances therefore match world
consumption and world government expenditures that are subject to cash requirements. Even
though we stick to domestic and foreign price indexes, regime II implies a union-wide price
level, i.e. pτ = p∗τ , due to symmetric preferences across countries.
The current account can be derived by integrating the households’ budget constraints over
time and by imposing the transversality condition. Under regime I, the domestic current
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account in the short run reads
pt(ct + gt) +Rtft+1 = (1− s) pat yat + s (pmht ymht + etpmh∗t ymh∗t ) (12)
Nominal expenditures on private and government consumption and on home-currency denomi-
nated bonds equal nominal income from goods sales. The latter comprise income from PTM
and PCP producers where we imposed symmetry among producers in each group.16 Once
nominal consumption expenditures exceed nominal income, the trade balance is negative and
households rely on bond financing. As for the foreign country, the short run current account
is analogously defined to equation (12).17 Since the distinction between PCP and PTM goods
is of no consequence in the long run, the domestic current accounts then reduce to
pt+1(ct+1 + gt+1) +Rt+1ft+2 = pht+1yt+1 + ft+1 (13)
where yt+1 now gives the production level of a typical domestic firm. In contrast to the
short run, pay-offs derived from maturing bonds acquired in the previous period enter national
income. Under regime II, the short and long run current accounts in both countries resemble
those of regime I in the long run. All nominal variables are then given in the common currency.
On the goods markets, one has to distinguish between PCP and PTM producers and the
respective sales markets only in the case of the short run equilibrium under regime I. The short
run domestic goods markets are then defined as
yat =
(
pat
pt
)−θ
n(ct + gt) +
(
pat
et p∗t
)−θ
(1− n)(c∗t + g∗t ) (14)
ymht =
(
pmht
pt
)−θ
n(ct + gt) (15)
ymh∗t =
(
pmh∗t
p∗t
)−θ
(1− n)(c∗t + g∗t ) (16)
16For the sake of lean exposition, it is convenient to drop the index h in the case of PCP producers. In the
case of PTM producers, the superscript h is necessary to indicate the origin of production while an asterisk
points to the foreign sales market.
17Note that foreign variables denoted in the domestic currency, e.g. nominal bonds under regime I, have to
be adjusted for the nominal exchange rate.
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The goods markets relate the respective production levels of the firms to domestic and foreign
demand. In the long run, demand for domestically produced goods only hinges on overall world
demand and on the relative domestic goods price as purchasing power parity holds:
yt+1 =
(
pht+1
pt+1
)−θ (
cwt+1 + g
w
t+1
)
(17)
Despite purchasing power parity, domestic and foreign producers set different prices if wages
differ internationally. Under regime II, short and long run goods market are defined analogously
to equation (17).
Under both regimes, the labor market clearing conditions only bind in the long run. Com-
bining the domestic households’ optimal labor supply decision and the firms’ pricing rule yields
κht+1 =
θ − 1
θ
pht+1
pt+1ct+1
(18)
with an analogous expression holding for the foreign country. Finally, the respective Euler
equations of the domestic and foreign households stated in table 1 apply in both periods under
both regimes.
3.2 World Aggregates and International Differentials
As the model is non-linear, we recur to an approximative solution via log-linearization.18 We
evaluate the dynamic system around a stationary equilibrium where initial bond holdings and
government expenditure equal zero. We do not provide an explicit description of the (pre-
shock) steady state as it is by and large standard, see for instance Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).
Instead, we directly turn to the analysis of the (post-shock) linearized short and long run world
aggregates and international differentials of consumption and output.
We first take a first-order Taylor approximation of the model and then divide the equations
by the respective steady state values of the variables. From then on, only the percentage devi-
ations from the steady state values are considered. Steady state deviations of a variable x are
18This implies that we may not consider large shocks to the dynamic system as the approximation error would
grow too much once you leave the steady state. In a major contribution to the NOEM literature, Corsetti and
Pesenti (2000) present a model solution without recurring to log-linearization.
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denoted by x˜ = dxx¯ , where x¯ represents the steady state value of x. Government expenditures
and bond holdings are scaled to steady state world consumption.
It is possible to derive analytical solutions for the individual variables using the fact that any
variable may be expressed as a function of the respective world aggregate and its international
differential.19 For any domestic variable x, its deviation from the initial steady state is given
by x˜ = x˜w + (1− n)(x˜− x˜∗) while for its foreign counterpart x˜∗ = x˜w − n(x˜− x˜∗) holds.
Table 2 summarizes the responses of world consumption and world output in the short and
long run which are valid under both regimes.
Table 2: World aggregates depending on λ
c˜wt = −λ
(
n
dgt
c¯w
+ (1− n) dg
∗
t
c¯w
)
y˜wt = (1− λ)
(
n
dgt
c¯w
+ (1− n) dg
∗
t
c¯w
)
c˜wt+1 = −
1
2
(
n
dgt+1
c¯w
+ (1− n) dg
∗
t+1
c¯w
)
y˜wt+1 =
1
2
(
n
dgt+1
c¯w
+ (1− n) dg
∗
t+1
c¯w
)
In the long run, classical dichotomy applies because prices are flexible. Combining popu-
lation weighted sums of long run labor markets and current accounts then gives the response
of long run world production. Permanent fiscal expansions stimulate output in the long run.
The major mechanism behind this result is that in times of flexible prices households respond
to the increased tax burden by supplying more labor. As the labor-leisure trade-off is binding
in the long run, they also reduce consumption. Hence, permanent fiscal expansions lead to a
partial crowding out of world private consumption.
In the short run, the money market equilibrium governs the responses of the world ag-
gregates. Under regime I (flexible exchange rates), we take weighted sums of the linearized
domestic and foreign money markets. Under regime II (monetary union), we make simply use of
the linearized version of the world money market equilibrium condition given by equation (11).
It is the parameter λ that rules the expansionary effects of fiscal policy in the short run. Once
there are no cash requirements for public expenditures, i.e. λ = 0, private world consumption
19See Aoki (1985) for a detailed discussion of the solution method.
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Table 3: International Consumption and Output Differentials
c˜t − c˜∗t = −
dgt − dg∗t
c¯w
− dft+1
p¯c¯w(1− n)(1 + r¯) + ((1− s)(θ − 1) + s)e˜t
c˜t+1 − c˜∗t+1 =
1 + θ
2θ
(1− β)dft+1
p¯c¯w(1− n) −
1 + θ
2θ
dgt+1 − dg∗t+1
c¯w
y˜t − y˜∗t = θ(1− s)e˜t
y˜t+1 − y˜∗t+1 = −
θ
1 + θ
(c˜t+1 − c˜∗t+1)
is not crowded out at all and world production is maximally stimulated. In the polar case
of λ = 1, complete crowding out of private consumption leaves world production unchanged.
These effects illustrate a general property of cash-in-advance constraints: Money establishes a
strict ceiling for the goods to be consumed, see Sriram (2001b). Therefore, the effectiveness
of fiscal policy in terms of output stimulation hinges crucially on the cash requirements of the
government.
Table 3 shows the log-linear international differences of short and long run consumption and
output in a general form.20 Under regime II, the exchange rate term vanishes, i.e. e˜t = 0 in the
above equations. The long run consumption differential depends on bond holdings and on the
government expenditure differential. Negative bond holdings imply permanent interest rate
payments and hence a negative wealth effect. In the long run flexible price equilibrium, house-
holds then tend to reduce consumption and to raise effort. A positive government expenditure
differential reduces the consumption differential because a greater share of the tax burden falls
on domestic households. The mirroring property of the output differential is basically due to
the long run labor-leisure trade off.
The short run consumption differential follows from the linearized current accounts and
goods markets. A positive government spending differential tends to lower relative domestic
20In the derivation we made use of the bond market clearing condition, n ft+1 = −(1−n) f∗t+1, and the steady
state property of long run bond holdings implying ft+1 = ft+2.
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consumption due to the associated tax burden. Domestic accumulation of debt, i.e. dft+1 < 0,
smoothes the short run consumption differential as of higher current consumption possibilities.
Finally, the last term captures the combined expenditure switching and terms of trade effects
prevailing under flexible exchange rates.21 The short production differential stems from the
linearized goods markets and hinges only on the exchange rate movement and on the pricing
behavior of firms. This is a direct consequence of the fact that the short system is entirely
demand determined. The production differential can be explained exclusively by expenditure
switching associated with exchange rate movements under regime I. In a monetary union, the
short run response of production is therefore identical in both countries.
3.3 Exchange Rate and Trade Balance
We now turn to the derivation of the short run exchange rate response under regime I and
explore the trade balance responses under both regimes thereafter.
The closed-form solution for the short exchange rate response can be derived from two ex-
change rate equations that stem from the monetary and the real side of the model, respectively.
Subtracting linearized versions of the short run money markets under regime I yields
m˜t − m˜∗t = p˜t − p˜∗t + c˜t − c˜∗t + λ
dgt − dg∗t
c¯w
With fixed money supplies in both countries and the linearized short run price differential given
by p˜t − p˜∗t = (1− s) e˜t, the exchange rate equation from the monetary part of the model reads
(1− s)e˜t = −(c˜t + λ dgt
c¯w
) + (c˜∗t + λ
dg∗t
c¯w
) (19)
On the monetary side of the model, the exchange rate reaction hinges on the differential between
domestic and foreign cash-financed absorption. If the sum of domestic private consumption
and cash relevant public expenditures exceeds the foreign equivalent, the nominal exchange
rate tends to appreciate.
On the real side of the model, that comprises the short run current accounts and goods
21These effects will be investigated in detail in section 4.
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markets, the exchange rate equation can be derived from the short run consumption differential
stated in the previous section:
((1− s)(θ − 1) + s)e˜t = c˜t − c˜∗t +
dft+1
p¯c¯w(1− n)(1 + r¯) +
dgt − dg∗t
c¯w
(20)
By combining the two exchange rate equations and eliminating endogenous bond holdings via
the long run consumption differential and the linearized short run Euler equation differential
we obtain the short run response of the nominal exchange rate:
e˜t =
(r¯ θ(1− λ) + r¯(1− λ)− 2θλ)dgt − dg
∗
t
c¯w
+ (1 + θ)
dgt+1 − dg∗t+1
c¯w
2θ + ((1− s)θ + s) r¯ (1 + θ) (21)
Whether an asymmetric fiscal expansion, where dg > 0 and dg∗ = 0, leads to an appreciation
or a depreciation of the exchange rate depends on the persistence of the shock and on the cash
requirements of government purchases.22 In the case of both a temporary and a permanent
shock, the exchange depreciates when cash is only required for consumption (λ = 0). However,
when all public purchases are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint (λ = 1), the exchange
rate appreciates. For intermediate values of λ we have to distinguish between a temporary and
a permanent shock. A temporary shock leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate for a
broad range of λ values, whereas a permanent shock brings about a depreciation even when a
large fraction of government purchases are cash relevant.
It is noteworthy that the limiting case of λ = 0 in the CIA setup generates exactly the
same exchange rate response as in a standard money-in-the-utility (MIU) model when real
balances enter the utility function logarithmically. This result is due to the formal equivalence
of the money market equilibria under the two settings. With λ = 0, money demand in the
CIA setup is consumption based as in a MIU model. Moreover, both specifications result in
a unit consumption elasticity of money demand. The only difference between the two money
demand variants lies in the interest elasticity: While the CIA constraint implies that money
demand is entirely independent of the interest rate, the logarithmic MIU model leads to a very
22The results derived in the sequel also apply in the more general case, where dg > dg∗ > 0.
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high interest elasticity of money demand. However, as exchange rate overshooting is precluded
in the latter case, the nominal interest rate cancels out of the money market differential and
does not affect the equilibrium response of the exchange rate. Intuitively, domestic and foreign
money demand are then subject to the same nominal interest rate and relative money demand
is independent of the interest rate. Hence, the two specifications of money demand are identical
with respect to their implications for the exchange rate response that follows an asymmetric
fiscal expansion.23
In order to explain the sensitivity of the exchange rate response to the assumed value of
λ, we compare the two polar cases λ = 1 and λ = 0. If all government expenditures are cash
relevant, the scale variable of money demand is the sum of private consumption and government
expenditures. According to the CIA constraint, higher tax-financed government expenditures
require a fall of private consumption or an increase of the household’s real balances. Due to the
households’ desire to smooth consumption over time, a full reduction of private consumption
is not optimal. Hence, domestic households have increased demand for real balances. With
fixed money supplies and rigid prices, this can only be brought about by an appreciation
of the exchange rate, that leads to lower prices of imports. In contrast, if there are no cash
requirements on the side of the government (λ = 0), the scale variable of money demand reduces
to private consumption and there is no direct crowding out effect of the fiscal expansion due to
the CIA constraints. However, as domestic households exclusively bear the higher tax burden,
they reduce short run consumption, which leads to a lower demand for real balances. This in
turn implies that the nominal exchange rate has to depreciate in equilibrium.
Figure 1 provides a numerical illustration of the short run exchange rate responses for the
two polar cases λ = 0 and λ = 1. We consider a one percent permanent increase in domestic
government expenditure and graph the exchange rate against the degree of pricing-to-market.
For simplicity, the two countries are assumed to be of the same size, i.e. n = 0.5. The remaining
parameters of the model are taken from the literature, specifically we follow Sutherland (1996)
in assuming an elasticity of substitution between individual goods of θ = 6 and a discount
factor β = 0.95, that implies an annual real rate of return of r¯ ≈ 0.05.
23In fact, we may show that not only the exchange rate response but also the remaining results are identical
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Figure 1: Short run exchange rate
The magnitude of the exchange rate response is governed by the pricing behavior of firms.
Higher values of s imply that a smaller share of the prices of imported goods is subject to
exchange rate movements and therefore the reaction of the exchange rate has to be more
pronounced.
We now turn to the trade balance responses under the two regimes, which provide the
essential links between the respective short and long run systems. Under regime I, we make
use of the exchange rate equations (19) and (20). The short run trade balance response then
reads:
dfFlext+1
p¯c¯w
= −(1− λ)(1− n)(1 + r¯)dgt − dg
∗
t
c¯w
+ (1− n)(1 + r¯)((1− s)θ + s)e˜t (22)
Figure 2 graphs the trade balance response against the degree of PTM for λ = 0 and λ = 1.
If all government expenditures are subject to the CIA constraint, the trade balance response
is always negative. This is due to the fact that short run domestic production is reduced
while overall domestic expenditures on consumption and taxes rise. A higher fraction of PTM
producers ameliorates the trade balance as expenditure switching towards foreign goods is
under the two money demand specifications.
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Figure 2: Short run trade balance under regime I
subdued and the income situation of domestic households improves.
For λ = 0, which corresponds to the logarithmic MIU specification, the trade balance
effect is mainly positive because the depreciation of the exchange rate stimulates domestic
production. Interestingly, the trade balance response is identical under both λ specifications
in the case of complete pricing-to-market. The economic intuition for this lies in the fact that
relative producer price changes, which determine nominal unit revenues, exactly offset the
differences of the consumption and production profiles in the two settings.
Under regime II (monetary union), the trade balance response can be derived via the long
and short run consumption differentials stated in table 3 and the Euler equation differential
which decides upon the intertemporal structure of the consumption differentials. The short
run trade balance response then reads
dfMUt+1
p¯c¯w
= (1− n)(1 + r¯)
(
− 2θ
r¯ + θr¯ + 2θ
dgt − dg∗t
c¯w
+
1 + θ
r¯ + θr¯ + 2θ
dgt+1 − dg∗t+1
c¯w
)
(23)
In a monetary union, the short run government expenditure differential has a negative effect on
the domestic trade balance, whereas the long run differential, that only arises when fiscal policy
shocks are permanent, acts towards an improvement. Temporary fiscal shocks thus lead to a
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strong negative response of the trade balance. Anticipating the higher future income, domestic
households - which exclusively bear the tax burden associated with the fiscal expansion -
increase their short run consumption level considerably by selling bonds to foreign households.
In the case of a permanent fiscal expansion domestic households face a similar income situation
in the short and long run, such that consumption smoothing is less relevant. However, as θ > 1,
we see from equation (23) that a permanent domestic fiscal expansion also prompts domestic
households to run a short run trade balance deficit.
4 Welfare
As our model is based on explicitly optimizing agents, the welfare analysis of fiscal policy does
not rely on ad hoc welfare criteria like in Mundell-Fleming type models, but on the specified
utility function of the representative households. We follow Tille (2001) in assuming that
government expenditure yields the same utility as steady state consumption at the margin, i.e.
V ′(gt) = (c¯)−1 = (c¯w)−1. If government expenditure were purely dissipative as for example
in Betts and Devereux (2000), the tax-induced negative welfare effect on domestic households
would always dominate the welfare effects of the interplay between the exchange rate response
and pricing-to-market behavior, that are at the focus of the analysis. Although our approach
is a polar case, it simply scales the results without loss of information because government
expenditures enter the utility function additively. Furthermore, when considering the welfare
differential of both regimes, the utility component associated with public spending cancels out
and does not alter the policy implications. Importantly, the welfare results for the foreign
country are always independent of this specification. Totally differentiating the household’s
utility function (1) yields for any period τ ∈ [t,∞]:
dUτ = c˜τ − κ h¯2 h˜τ + V ′(gτ )dgτ
= c˜τ − θ − 1
θ
h˜τ +
dgτ
c¯w
(24)
where we made use of the steady state value of output (hours worked). It is important to note
that the degree of monopolistic competition, that is represented by the elasticity of substitution
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of goods θ, decides upon the relative weight of leisure in the process of utility evaluation.
Intuitively, a low substitutability of the differentiated goods implies a low steady state output
level and hence a low marginal disutility of labor. At the same time, marginal utility of
consumption will be high.
Before turning to a comparison of the short run, long run, and overall welfare evolutions
in the two countries under both exchange rate regimes, a closer look at the welfare driving
transmission mechanisms under flexible exchange rates is necessary. We identify two effects as
the driving forces of the international distribution of overall welfare both of them stemming
from the short run movement of the exchange rate: an expenditure switching effect and a
terms-of-trade effect. For λ < 1 we also obtain a welfare enhancing demand stimulation effect.
However, this effect is entirely symmetric and identical under both exchange rate regimes.
Therefore, it does not matter for the comparison of exchange rate regimes. In the long run,
prices are flexible, and terms-of-trade and expenditure switching effects are fully anticipated.
In the short run, however, the response of the exchange rate governs the competitiveness of
domestic and foreign firms and thereby affects welfare in both countries. If the exchange rate
depreciates, demand is redirected towards domestic firms and short run domestic production is
stimulated at the expense of foreign production. From our above reasoning, the monopolistic
distortion is then abated in the domestic economy and there is a positive welfare impulse on
domestic households. In the case of an appreciation, the output and welfare implications are
reversed. The magnitude of the expenditure switching effect is governed by the degree of
pricing-to-market. For s = 0, it is at its maximum, while it vanishes with complete pricing-
to-market. At the same time, however, the purchasing power of additional production varies
with the short run evolution of the terms of trade, which we derive for the domestic country
by linearizing equation (4):
τ˜t = (2 s− 1) e˜t (25)
Against the backdrop of an exchange rate depreciation (appreciation) and rigid prices, the
domestic terms of trade deteriorate (improve) as long as s < 0.5 and improve (deteriorate) for
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s > 0.5. To give some intuition for this result, consider the two polar cases s = 0 and s = 1 for
an exchange rate depreciation. Without pricing-to-market, domestic households face higher
import prices, while export prices remain unchanged in domestic currency. In the opposite
case of full pricing-to-market, domestic import prices are unchanged whereas unit revenues of
exports rise. While the expenditure switching effect decides upon the production structure,
the terms of trade determine the consumption possibilities arising from additional output.
Combining both effects, we can give a comprehensive analysis of the role of pricing-to-
market for overall welfare. With s = 0, the strong expenditure switching effect is exactly offset
by the evolution of the terms of trade. The overall welfare effect is then independent of the short
term change in relative prices. Hence, an asymmetric fiscal expansion has symmetric effects
on welfare in the two countries when the law of one price holds for all goods. With s = 0.5,
the terms-of-trade are unchanged and it is only the expenditure switching effect which decides
upon the welfare evolution in the two countries. With s = 1, expenditure switching disappears
as relative prices are unchanged. However, depending on the direction of the exchange rate
movement, the terms-of-trade work strongly in favor of one of the two countries. In a world of
complete pricing-to-market, there is a very asymmetric distribution of welfare gains following
a domestic fiscal expansion.
Based on these considerations, we can now analyze short run welfare in the two countries
under both exchange rate regimes which is given in a general semi-reduced form by
dUt = c˜wt −
(θ − 1)
θ
h˜wt − (1− n)
dgt
c¯w
− dft+1
p¯c¯w(1 + r¯)
+
dgt
c¯w
+ (1− n)se˜t
=
1
θ
h˜wt −
dft+1
p¯c¯w(1 + r¯)
+ s(1− n)e˜t (26)
dU∗t =
1
θ
h˜wt +
ndft+1
p¯c¯w(1 + r¯)(1− n) − n s e˜t (27)
where e˜t drops out of the system under regime II. The respective responses of the world
aggregates, the trade balance, and the exchange rate are stated in section 3.3. Firstly, both
countries benefit symmetrically from possible welfare gains that arise if world production is
stimulated and consumption possibilities increase. This effect is independent of the exchange
rate regime. As outlined above, the degree of output stimulation hinges on the assumed cash
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requirements for public expenditure. While short run world output does not increase at all for
λ = 1, output stimulation is maximal in the λ = 0 case, as world private consumption is then
not crowded out. Secondly, the domestic trade balance response is unambiguously negative
in the λ = 1 case under flexible exchange rates and in the case of a monetary union. Short
run domestic welfare then rises at the expense of foreign welfare. For λ = 0 under regime I,
however, the trade balance response is mainly positive as domestic output increases due to the
depreciation of the exchange rate. The trade balance response then tends to favor the foreign
country. Thirdly, the exchange rate response under regime I affects short run welfare in both
countries. This term captures the combined terms-of-trade and expenditure switching effects
and works towards higher domestic welfare in the λ = 0 case (depreciation) and towards higher
foreign welfare in the λ = 1 case (appreciation).
In order to obtain the welfare effects of a transition from a flexible exchange rate system
to a monetary union, we define the domestic welfare differential for any period τ ∈ [t,∞]:
dU∆τ = dU
MU
τ − dUFlexτ (28)
with an analogous expression holding for the foreign country. Hence, if dU∆τ > 0, a transition
to a monetary union is beneficial for domestic households. The domestic and foreign short run
welfare differentials read
dU∆t = −
dfMUt+1 − dfFlext+1
p¯c¯w(1 + r¯)
− (1− n)se˜t (29)
dU∗∆t =
n(dfMUt+1 − dfFlext+1 )
p¯c¯w(1− n)(1 + r¯) + nse˜t (30)
As the world output stimulation is independent of the monetary regime the respective terms
cancel out when taking differences. Thus, the short run welfare differential only depends on
the difference in bond holdings and on the exchange rate effect under flexible exchange rates.
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) depict the numerical results of the short run utility differential in the
two countries for alternative values of λ and a permanent fiscal expansion. For the sake of
brevity, we do not present graphical illustrations of a temporary fiscal expansion, which yields
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the same qualitative results.
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Figure 3: Short run utility differentials, permanent expansion
It becomes evident that the short run welfare implications of a fiscal shock hinge crucially
on the assumptions about cash requirements of public expenditures and on the pricing behavior
of firms. For λ = 1, we obtain the following short run welfare results: For a broad range of
s, domestic households suffer welfare losses when moving from a flexible exchange rate regime
to a monetary union, while foreign households are better off. This is due to the fact that
for low values of s the appreciation of the exchange rate in the flexible regime has a positive
(negative) impact on short run domestic (foreign) welfare. In equations (29) and (30), the
exchange rate term, which works in favor of a monetary union, is then dominated by the bond
holding differential, where the flexible part is also driven by the exchange rate movement. On
the one hand, expenditure switching leads to lower (higher) domestic (foreign) production and
hence less labor effort, which results in short run welfare gains (losses) for domestic (foreign)
households. Domestic households recur more to debt financing, which has a strong positive
effect on short run welfare. On the other hand, values of s below 0.5 also imply a positive
(negative) terms-of-trade effect for domestic (foreign) households under flexible exchange rates,
which is absent in the monetary union case. For very high levels of pricing-to-market behavior,
27
in contrast, domestic households are better off under a monetary union as they suffer from
a negative terms-of-trade effect under flexible exchange rates. In the polar case of s = 1,
expenditure switching vanishes under flexible exchange rates and the trade balance response
is identical under both regimes as pointed out in the previous section. The positive domestic
welfare differential therefore reflects exclusively the different terms-of-trade under the two
regimes. The opposite reasoning applies for the foreign country.
In the case of λ = 0, the short run welfare results are completely reversed. The absence of
an exchange rate depreciation in a monetary union makes domestic (foreign) households better
(worse) off, except for very high degrees of pricing-to-market.
Turning to the long run welfare effects, the semi-reduced forms of the utility equations
under both regimes read
dUt+1 =
1
θ
h˜wt+1 +
r¯ dft+1
p¯c¯w(1 + r¯)
(31)
dU∗t+1 =
1
θ
h˜wt+1 −
n r¯ dft+1
p¯c¯w(1 + r¯)(1− n) (32)
Long run welfare thus only depends on a possible stimulation of world output and on bond
holdings. World production increases only in the case of a permanent fiscal expansion. The
resulting welfare gains are again equally shared by domestic and foreign households. The utility
effects of bond holdings now mirror those of the short run: In the case of λ = 1 under regime I
and in a monetary union domestic households face a utility loss as they have to pay interests
on debt accumulated in the short run, whereas foreign households benefit from additional
consumption possibilities. The opposite is true for λ = 0 under regime I, but for high degrees
of pricing-to-market.
As in the analysis of the short run, we now derive the semi-reduced long run welfare
differentials in both countries:
dU∆t+1 =
dfMUt+1 − dfFlext+1
p¯c¯w(1 + r¯)
(33)
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dU∗∆t+1 = −
n(dfMUt+1 − dfFlext+1 )
p¯c¯w(1− n)(1 + r¯) (34)
The numerical solutions of the long run welfare differentials for a permanent expansion are
depicted in figures 4(a) and 4(b).
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Figure 4: Long run utility differentials, permanent expansion
For λ = 1, domestic long run utility is higher in a monetary union due to the lower short
run trade balance response except for the case of s = 1. Domestic households then face lower
permanent interest payments to foreigners. For the special case of complete pricing-to-market,
however, the trade balance response is identical under both regimes and no long run utility
differential arises. For λ = 0, the domestic trade balance differential is always negative except
for s = 1, hence the negative long run welfare differential. The opposite reasoning applies for
the foreign country.
Combining the impact on short and long run welfare we obtain the overall effect on welfare
in the two countries:
dΩt =
1
θ
(
h˜wt +
1
r¯
h˜wt+1
)
+ (1− n) s e˜t (35)
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dΩ∗t =
1
θ
(
h˜wt +
1
r¯
h˜wt+1
)
− n s e˜t (36)
While the pattern of bond holdings determines the intertemporal utility profile, it does not enter
overall welfare. The optimal bond holding decision of households is characterized by the trade-
off between present and future consumption possibilities. Foreign households are only willing
to finance domestic short run consumption if they are entirely compensated via permanent
interest income in the future. The net present value of bonds in terms of welfare is therefore
zero. Hence, the impact on overall welfare hinges only on the level of the symmetric output
stimulation effects and on the asymmetric effects stemming from the short run movement of
the nominal exchange rate (regime I). In the case of s = 0, expenditure switching and terms-of-
trade effects are exactly offsetting such that households in both countries benefit symmetrically
from the domestic fiscal expansion not only under regime II, but also under regime I.
Combining the short and long run utility differentials yields the overall welfare differentials
which are valid for both temporary and permanent expansions:
dΩ∆t = −(1− n) s e˜t (37)
dΩ∗∆t = n s e˜t (38)
Hence, the overall welfare effects of a transition to a monetary union depend exclusively on the
pricing behavior of firms and on the short exchange rate response. The latter, in turn, hinges
on the public cash requirements. As also depicted in figures 5(a) and 5(b), with λ = 1 domestic
households are better off in a monetary union regime except for s = 0, while foreign households
are worse off. With λ = 0, the welfare implications are completely reversed. As before, we
do not depict the welfare results of a temporary expansion which yields the same qualitative
results. From an overall welfare perspective, the difference between the two exchange rate
regimes lies in the combined expenditure switching and terms-of-trade effects prevailing in the
flexible exchange rate regime. The two effects are exactly offsetting when the law of one price
holds for all goods (s = 0). Hence, the exchange rate regime does not matter for the welfare
implications of an asymmetric fiscal expansion. The irrelevance of the exchange rate regime
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Figure 5: Overall utility differentials, permanent expansion
in the s = 0 case is closely related to the intrinsic symmetry property of the baseline Redux
model, where the origin of the macroeconomic disturbance does not affect the international
pattern of overall welfare.24
As long as a fraction of producers pursue pricing-to-market, the welfare effects of a transition
to a monetary union hinge on the short run response of the nominal exchange rate. For λ = 1,
the implied appreciation favors foreign households. The establishment of a monetary union
is therefore welfare enhancing for the domestic country and welfare reducing for the foreign
country. With complete pricing-to-market, the respective welfare differentials are maximal.
Expenditure switching is then absent even under flexible exchange rates while the terms-of-
trade effect of the appreciation exerts a strong negative effect on domestic welfare and a strong
positive effect on foreign welfare. A monetary union is thus beneficial for the domestic economy
and detrimental for the foreign country. For λ = 0, the resulting depreciation of the nominal
exchange rate has exactly the opposite consequences. The establishment of a monetary union
is detrimental to domestic households, while it is beneficial for foreign households.
24In the light of fiscal policy this result only holds if government expenditures fully enter the households’
utility function.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have explored the international transmission mechanisms and welfare effects
of fiscal policy in a theoretical model of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics approach.
We have provided a general analysis framework that allows us to boil down the model to very
tractable semi-reduced welfare equations. The solution technique can be of use for the welfare
analysis of various topics in international macroeconomics.
At the center of our analysis have been the implications of alternative scale variables of
money demand for the comparison of a flexible exchange rate regime with a monetary union.
Our main finding is that accounting for the public component of money demand reverses
the qualitative welfare implications of asymmetric fiscal policies found in standard NOEM
models where private consumption is the scale variable of money demand. Quantitatively, the
obtained welfare differentials between the different exchange rate regimes are governed by the
degree of pricing-to-market. In general, our analysis cautions for the specific choice of the
money demand specification when fiscal policy is the predominant source of macroeconomic
disturbances. Given the importance of the public sector in most European countries a money
demand function that does not allow for a public component may yield misleading welfare
implications of alternative exchange rate regimes.
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